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INTRODUCTION

Software licenses are executory contracts subject to rejection, assumption, or assignment in bankruptcy proceedings.- The bankruptcy
trustee (the "Trustee") can generally reject, assume, or assign the contract without the nondebtor's consent, notwithstanding any contract
clause or nonbankruptcy law that prohibits or restricts the Trustee's action or that proposes termination or modification of the license as a result of the bankruptcy filing. However, the Bankruptcy Code does
provide an exception where applicable law would "excuse" the
nondebtor from rendering to, or accepting performance from, a party
other than the debtor.2 This article addresses the Bankruptcy Code exception, in the context of software licenses, and seeks to identify the cir*

Partner, Brown & Bain, P.A., Phoenix, Arizona; J.D. Harvard Law School 1977;

B.A. University of Arizona 1974.
1. See infra text accompanying note 3.
2. See infra text accompanying note 8.
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cumstances under which the filing of a bankruptcy petition excuses the
nondebtor party to the software license from further performance.
II.

SOFTWARE LICENSES IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS

After a software company develops a software product, the company will generally attempt to capitalize on its efforts by licensing the
software to others. These transactions may take a variety of forms.
The typical software license provides that the software company will
deliver a "finished" software product to the user. In many cases, the
software company also agrees to correct any software defects or "bugs"
that are discovered, and to periodically provide the user with improved,
updated versions of the software. The software user, in return, pays
one fee for the software, and may also agree to pay an additional fee, or
royalty, if the software he licenses is incorporated into one of the products he (the user) manufactures. In addition, the software user often
promises that he will not (1) disclose any of the confidential information the software company provides to the user, (2) reproduce or otherwise copy the software, and (3) assign or sublicense the software
without the consent of the software company.
Thus, a software agreement generally contains continuing obligations on the part of both parties. As a result, most software licenses are
likely to be deemed executory contracts for purposes of bankruptcy law.
The federal Bankruptcy Code empowers the Trustee to reject or assume an executory license; if the Trustee assumes it, the code empow3
ers the Trustee to assign the license to a third party.
Under most circumstances, a Trustee can assign the software license without the nondebtor's consent. 4 The assignment may be made
notwithstanding any provision of applicable law or the license terms
that would prohibit, restrict, or condition the assignment. 5 Similarly,
filing a petition under the Bankruptcy Code does not, in itself, usually
result in the termination or modification of the software license;6 the
license remains in full force and effect, despite any contract clause or
3. See Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506, 102
Stat. 2538 (codified at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 365(n) (1988)). The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act limits the ability of the trustee of a debtor-licensor to reject the
license.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(1) (1982). If the trustee desires to assign the license, the trustee
must first assume the license and provide adequate assurance of future performance. Id.
§ 365(f)(2).
5. Id. § 365(f)(1).
6. Id. § 365 provides:
(e)(1) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired lease,
or in applicable law, an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor may
not be terminated or modified, and any right or obligation under such contract or
lease may not be terminated or modified, at any time after the commencement of
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nonbankruptcy law that would permit the license to be terminated or
7
modified under such circumstances.
III.

EXCUSABILITY OF PERFORMANCE

The Bankruptcy Code does provide an exception to the rules
prohibiting license termination and permitting license assignment.
Under this exception, a termination or modification provision triggered
by the bankruptcy will remain operative, and an assignment will be impermissible, if "applicable law" would "excuse" the nondebtor from accepting performance from, or rendering performance to, a person other
than the debtor.8 It is clear that the statute refers to applicable
"nonbankruptcy" law. 9 In this situation, the code requires the
nondebtor's consent to prevent termination or to permit assignment. 10
The nondebtor's consent is required even if the contract itself does not
expressly require it." Furthermore, even if the license does require
consent, the issue of consent must be resolved without respect to that
the case solely because of a provision in such contract or lease that is conditioned
on(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time before
the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title; or
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case under
this title or a custodian before such commencement.
7. Id.
8. Id. § 365(c) provides:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to
an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, whether or not
such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation
of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment; ....
Id. § 365(e) provides:
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if(A)(i) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering performance to
the trustee or to an assignee of such contract or lease, whether or not such
contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties; and
(ii) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment; ....
9. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5963, 6304.
10. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(c)(1)(B), 365(e)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
11. Id. §§ 365(c)(1)(A), 365(e)(2)(A)(i).
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"Excused" performance can be viewed as referring to any case
where the debtor has materially breached the software license. At the
other extreme, it has been implied that the provisions are restricted to
agreements contemplating a particular individual's rendition of services. 13 The former interpretation is too broad, since the statutory language is framed around the contractual concept of whether the
nondebtor party can be required to accept performance from, or render
performance to, anyone other than the debtor. 14 On the other hand, the
exception is not limited to agreements involving an individual's performance of services.' 5 Indeed, the section's legislative history does not
mention that the exception is limited to any particular type of agreement or that the words of the statute are to be construed in one particu16
lar way.
Although the Bankruptcy Code expressly requires reference to applicable nonbankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts, for the most part, have
not made extensive reference to such law in attempting to resolve the
cases that have come before them. The bankruptcy courts should not
be blamed for this analytical approach, inasmuch as nonbankruptcy authorities, perhaps from a lack of understanding of bankruptcy law, perceive general principles of contract law to be inapplicable in a
bankruptcy setting.1 7 Nevertheless, assuming that the Bankruptcy
Code does contemplate the use of applicable nonbankruptcy law, reference must be made to these common law principles.
Determining which laws constitute "applicable nonbankruptcy law"
is especially difficult in the area of software licenses. Since most
software licenses involve copyrighted material, one question is whether
the Copyright Act' s constitutes "applicable nonbankruptcy law,"
12. Id. §§ 365(c)(1)(A), 365(e)(2)(A)(i); H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5963, 6304.

13. Cf. In re Taylor Mfg., 6 Bankr. 370, 372 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1980) (using the example of an opera singer).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A)(i) (1982) (enforceability of insolvency clauses where applicable law excuses the nondebtor party from performance with respect to "the trustee
or to an assignee"); Id. § 365(c)(1)(A) (impermissibility of assignment where applicable
law excuses the nondebtor party from performance with respect to "an entity other than
the debtor or the debtor-in-possession").
15. In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 29 (lst Cir. 1984); In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d 935, 943 (5th Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 705 F.2d 450 (5th Cir. 1983); In re
Nitec Paper Corp., 43 Bankr. 492, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984).
16. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 348, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5963, 6304.
17. E.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 316 comment d (1981) (bankruptcy
assignments are not within the scope of the Restatement).
18. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1982).
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thereby superseding otherwise applicable state law. Generally, the
Copyright Act should be deemed inapplicable. Under the Rules of Decision Act,' 9 a federal court must apply applicable state law unless the
Constitution, United States' treaties or federal statutes "provide or require" a specific result. 20

The Copyright Act does not prescribe what

status licenses have upon bankruptcy, and thus should not be controlling.2 1 In addition, no federal common law rules are applicable, as evidenced by cases to be discussed later.22 Accordingly, the bankruptcy
court must look to state law in addressing the excusability of software
licenses. 23 In most cases, the law of the state designated by the parties
24
in the software license will control.
Having said this much, it is clear that the common law of contracts
does not provide any real answer to the issue of excusing the nondebtor
from rendering performance to, or accepting performance from, a third
party. Instead, each situation must be judged on all the facts and circumstances. 25 It is not necessarily unusual to delegate contract duties
to perform.26 However, delegating contract duties that call for personal
services, skill, or discretion is unusual. 27 A particular contract can call
for personal performance even where delegation is normal. 28 Conversely, a contract may permit delegation even where personal performance is usually required. 29 In any event, it should no longer make a
difference that the party to the contract is a corporation or other entity
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
20. Id.
21. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(e) (1986) (while § 201(e) addresses involuntary transfers occurring by operation of law, it expressly provides that it does not apply to bankruptcy
proceedings).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 48-79. See also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965) (discussing essentially an outcome-determination test for judge-made rules).
23. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); but see 28 U.S.C. § 1961 (Supp. I 1983);
Chapman & Cole v. Itel Container International B.V., 865 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1989).
24. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 186 (1971) (contract issues are determined by the law chosen by parties in accordance with rules of § 187 and
otherwise under rules of § 188). See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487
(1941) (federal court must follow state choice-of-law rules).
25. See, e.g., 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 856 (1951) ("It can also be stated
with conviction that in no field of the law more than in assignment is greater profit to be
obtained from a clear and detailed analysis of the operative facts and the legal relations
resulting therefrom.").
26. U.C.C. § 2-210 comment 1 (1988); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318
comment c (1981). In passing, it should be noted that, in common law parlance, rights are
"assigned," and duties are "delegated." Id. § 316 comment c.
27. Id. § 318 comment c. Cf. id. § 317 comment d (if duty depends on personal discretion, substituting another's personal discretion is likely to be a material change preventing
assignment under the Restatement rules).
28. Id. § 318 comment c.
29. Id.
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rather than an individual.3 0 Moreover, even if performance is personal
and nondelegable, the condition of personal performance is waived by
31
consent.
In light of these considerations, the Restatement of Contracts contemplates that, absent an agreement to the contrary, delegation should
be prohibited only where the person to whom the performance is to be
rendered has a "substantial interest" in having the particular person
render or oversee the performance.3 2 Ultimately, the question of
whether performance must be rendered by a particular person can be
decided only by reference to the words of the software license, itself,
and it must be recognized that reasonable people will differ as to the
33
appropriate conclusion.
IV.

FACTORS EVIDENCING EXCUSABILITY

Bankruptcy courts, which have addressed the question of excusability, seem to have done so against a background of extreme confusion as to the scope of the exception, as well as its interrelationship
with the other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Nevertheless, a review of the cases indicates that there are several factors which the
courts constantly turn to in the course of analysis, although no one
court has considered all of these factors in a particular case. These
30. But cf. 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 865 n.4 (1951) (citing New England
Iron Co. v. Gilbert El. R. Co., 91 N.Y. 153 (1883) (since contractor was a corporation, a
construction contract did not involve a personal relationship or confidence)).
31. Id. § 865 (1951).
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 318(2) (1981) provides: "Unless otherwise agreed, a promise requires performance by a particular person only to the extent
that the obligee has a substantial interest in having that person perform or control the
acts promised." Accordingly, in the absence of contrary agreement, the Restatement bars
delegation of performance only where the delegated performance would not be as satisfactory as the performance by the original obligor. Id. § 318 comment c.
33. 4 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 866 (1951). A number of older cases illustrate that the common law has long viewed the potential nondelegability as being applicable to a broader variety of situations than merely employment agreements. E.g., Walker
Elec. Co. v. N.Y. Shipbuilding Co., 241 F. 569 (3d Cir. 1917) (no assignment of contract for
design and installation of electric switchboards on battleship); Sloan v. Williams, 138 Ill.
43, 27 N.E. 531 (1891) (no assignment of contract for legal services); Smith v. Board of Education, 115 Kan. 155, 222 P. 101 (1924) (no assignment of contract for county printing regarded as "art"); Eastern Advertising Co. v. McGaw, 89 Md. 72, 42 A. 923 (1899) (no
assignment of contract for designing advertising cards); New England Cabinet Works v.
Morris, 226 Mass. 246, 115 N.E. 315 (1917) (no assignment of contracts for designing and
installing druggists' fixtures); Edison v. Babka, 111 Mich. 235, 69 N.W. 499 (1896) (no assignment of contract with nurseryman); Corson v. Lewis, 77 Neb. 446, 109 N.W. 735 (1906)
(no assignment of contract with attorney); Wooster v. Crane & Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 22, 66 A.
1093 (1907) (no assignment of contract with printer and publisher); Deaton v. Lawson, 40
Wash. 486, 82 P. 879 (1905) (no assignment of contract for a doctor's services).
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principal factors are: special relationship, reputation, skill, credit, and
contract specific features.
A.

SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP

Some courts have posited that the exception is concerned primarily
with agreements that involve a "special relationship," but this position
has been strongly criticized. 34 While one criticism could be that nearly
every contract, and surely all software licenses, create, more or less, a
special relationship; clearly the courts have used this phrase in a narrower sense. This "special relationship" factor has been couched in
terms of a relationship of "trust," and, thus, could be viewed in more
35
workable terms as one requiring a "quasi-fiduciary" relationship.
However, the cases which have utilized this phrasing, have used the
word "trust" to connote a broader notion than just common-law fiduci36
ary duty.
Regardless of the definition of trust used, an employment agreement, or perhaps even an investment banking relationship, could have
certain fiduciary aspects, 37 while car dealership and electric power
agreements-which have also been found to be nonassignable-proba38
bly do not.
Thus, to say that this "trust" was present in all the cases holding
for nonassignment, "trust" would have to be given its everyday meaning, suggesting "confidence." But then again, a certain amount of "confidence" in the other party is inherent in most software licensing
agreements, even in the absence of a fiduciary relationship. Therefore,
"trust and confidence" should not serve as an independent basis for barring assignment. Rather, the issue of assignability must be resolved using the other factors described below.
34. In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 Bankr. 492, 497-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing In re
Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 30 Bankr. 458, 459 (D.R.I. 1983)); Pioneer, 30 Bankr. 458, rev'd
729 F.2d 27 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1984) (nonassignability should not be based on whether the
contract is for personal service or pertains to a special relationship, but should be based
on applicable nonbankruptcy law).

35. Eg., Villar & Co., Inc. v. Conde, 30 F.2d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 1929) (contract for personal services involved "trust"); Ford, Bacon & Davis, Inc. v. Holahan, 311 F.2d 901, 904
(5th Cir. 1962) (the important question is whether one party placed trust and confidence
in the other).
36. Because the courts have used the word "trust" broadly, a true fiduciary relation-

ship would, of course, come within the bounds of this exception.
37. E.g., Villar, 30 F.2d at 590 (employment service contract involved issue of trust
and was nonassignable); Ford, 311 F.2d at 904 (contract for service involved confidence in
the promoter's reputation for skill and was nonassignable).

38. Pioneer,729 F.2d 27 (nonassignability of car dealership franchise based on applicable nonbankruptcy law); Nitec, 43 Bankr. 492 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (nonassignability of
electrical power agreement based on applicable nonbankruptcy law).
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REPUTATION

Some courts have viewed the question of excusability as hinging
upon whether the nondebtor party has reposed confidence in the reputation of the debtor.39 Again, in most cases, one party will have a certain amount of trust and confidence in the ability of the other party to
perform before making the decision to enter into a software license
with that party. The distinguishing feature, with regard to software
licenses, is that the first party also has formed some opinion as to the
reputation of the other party. Consequently, reputation becomes a separate fact, and whether the other party actually has the requisite skill
or integrity can become irrelevant. For example, on the question of assignability, it is relatively unimportant whether the employees of the
debtor who actually perform the work have evidenced any particular

skill.

40

C.

SKILL

If the debtor evidenced some actual skill or acumen which constitutes an inducement to the contract, the courts tend to find the exception to be applicable. 41 Again, nearly every software user enters into a
software licensing agreement because he believes the software developer is a better programmer than himself. Likewise, many developers
enter into licensing agreements believing that the users, because of
their skill in a particular area, are better equipped than the developer
to test and capitalize on the licensed software. These reliances are not
limited to persons who are professionals or generally-recognized experts, but may also extend to people who have been successful in ex39. E.g., Ford, 311 F.2d at 904 ("The important inquiry is into the nature of the contract itself, to determine if it... rests upon the other party's placing trust and confidence
in the reputation of the bankrupt").
40. Id. at 904 (it was not conclusive that the nondebtor party did not know precisely
who the debtor would use to carry out the services; "to the extent that Gulf had a reputation for skill and integrity, that reputation would be partially based upon the past performance of its employees, so that one could rely upon Gulf's skill in selecting
employees.") (emphasis by the court).
41. E.g., id. at 904 (the important question is whether the non-debtor placed trust and
confidence in the bankrupt's reputation for "skill and integrity"); Miller v. Mutual Holding Co., 101 F.2d 323, 324 (6th Cir. 1939) (where debtor had "built up some knowledge of,
and aptitude for" a certain business and "his acumen led to the discovery of" the asset on
which the business was based and he offered to operate the business if the other party
would finance the business, the debtor's rights depended on the "personal performance of
his obligations" and the contract did not pass to his trustee in bankruptcy); Knipe v.
Barkdull, 35 Cal. Rptr. 283, 285, 222 Cal. App. 2d 547, 551 (1963) ("where a contract calls
for skill, credit or other personal qualities of the promisor, it is not assignable" (citing 1 B.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 353 and the cases cited therein).
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ploiting a particular market niche.42
D.

CREDIT

At least one court has suggested that excusability should also apply
where reliance is placed on the debtor's credit. 43 In a bankruptcy pro-

ceeding, this basis for excusability presents at least two conceptual difficulties. First, since almost every software license involves delivery of
software based on the user's credit, applying this rule would essentially
permit the nondebtor to terminate or modify any software license, despite section 365(e)(1) and the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act.44 Moreover, the issue of assignability would be rendered
moot. Second, the Bankruptcy Code provides an express, separate exception from the invalidation of insolvency clauses (and from assumption and assignment) where the contract is primarily financial in
nature.45 One means of reconciling the Bankruptcy Code and the common law in this situation would be to undertake a two-step analysis:
Determine whether the arrangement is primarily financial in nature,
and
(a) if the arrangement is primarily financial, determine whether
it is encompassed by sections 365(c)(2) or 365(e)(2)(B); and
(b) if it is not primarily financial, determine whether it is excusable under sections 365(c)(1) or 365(e)(2)(A).

E.

CONTRACT SPECIFIC FEATURES

The courts appear to recognize that there may be circumstances,
other than the foregoing, that would justify excusability under the exception.46 This recognition is simply an acknowledgment that the test
of excusability is dependent upon all the facts and circumstances en42. Cf. In re D.H. McBride, 132 F. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1904) (publisher of religious books).
43. Knipe, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 285 (where a contract calls for credit of the promisor, it is
not assignable).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1) (1982) (notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract,
the contract may not be terminated or modified after commencement of a bankruptcy
proceeding solely because of a provision that is conditioned on insolvency or financial condition of the debtor). Enacted as part of the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection
Act, supra note 3, § 365(n)(1) applies only to rejected licenses. A license that terminates
by its own terms pursuant to an insolvency clause is incapable of assumption or rejection
(as it no longer exists).
45. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(2) (1982) (trustee may not assume or assign an executory contract if it is a contract to make a loan, or to extend other debt financing or financial accommodations to, or for the benefit of, the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor); Id.
§ 365(e)(2)(B) (Bankruptcy Code's invalidation of insolvency clauses does not apply to
contracts to make a loan, or to extend other debt financing or financial accommodations
to, or for the benefit of, the debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor).
46. In re Nitec Paper Corp., 43 Bankr. 492, 497-98 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (the excusability exception under 365(c) refers to "non-delegable" duties); Knipe v. Barkdull, 222
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compassing the agreement and requires scrutiny of the inherent nature
47
of the contract at issue.
V.

CASE LAW

While the foregoing factors, and excusability law in general, are relatively straightforward, difficulties arise when the courts attempt to apply them to the somewhat unique situation of software licenses. The
issue of bankruptcy assignment of copyrights was first addressed in In
re D.H. McBride & Co. 48

In that case, an author had written a multi-

volume work; its market was limited to Roman Catholic parochial
schools and convents. The author entered into an agreement with a
publisher, whereby she assigned her copyright in the book to the publisher. In return, the publisher was responsible for selling and advertising the work, paying sales royalties to the author, and providing the
author with a full accounting of books manufactured and sold. If the
publisher discontinued publication, or failed for any other reason to perform the agreement, the copyright would revert to the author. With regard to assignability, the agreement prohibited the publisher from
assigning the author's copyright without her written consent, but reserved to the author the right to assign her royalties without the publisher's consent.
The court noted that the arrangement depended upon the character
and relations of the publisher, since its religious affiliations, connections, goodwill and trade name were vital and important considerations
"of which the claimant [could not] be deprived without her consent. '4 9
Consequently, the court held that the contract was a personal agreement involving trust and confidence which could not be assigned or del50
egated to another without the author's consent.
The court acknowledged the argument that "assignments by operaCal. App. 2d 547, 551, 35 Cal. Rptr. 283, 285 (1963) ("where a contract calls for the skill,
credit or other personal quality of the promisor, it is not assignable").
47. At least one court has suggested that this would permit finding nondelegability as
a matter of law, if a nonbankruptcy federal or state law expressly prohibits assignment.
Nitec, 43 Bankr. at 498. This approach appears to be in error for two reasons. First, the
concept of excusability in contract law requires analysis of the inherent nature of the contract at issue and depends upon all the facts and circumstances of the case, whereas the
existence of a federal or state statute prohibiting the assignment is external to the contract and is a matter of law. Second, such an approach ignores Section 365(f)(1), which
permits assignment "notwithstanding a provision ...

in applicable law that prohibits, re-

stricts or conditions the assignment." Id. It can be inferred that the Nitec court recognized these objections, since it went on to discuss the underlying policies that would
recommend against delegation of the contractual duties in the case before it. Id. at 498-99.
48. 132 F. 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1904).
49. Id. at 288.
50. Id. at 287-88.
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tion of law" are normally an exception to the personal agreement rule,
and assignable, despite contract language to the contrary, because such
operations must be deemed to have been in contemplation of the parties
at the time of contract. The court, however, held that, notwithstanding
the parties' awareness of the possibility of bankruptcy, considerations of
"personal trust and confidence" must override such awareness. The
court based its decision, in part, on the rationale that a copyright license
is quite similar to a patent license, and that unlike a lease-a type of
contract that does normally pass to a bankruptcy trustee despite a provision barring assignment-a patent license does not pass to a receiver
by operation of law. 5 1 As a result, the contract was found to be controlling, and this contract involving personal trust and confidence was held
52
to be nonassignable, even by operation of law.
In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co. 53 involved a motion by certain
song composers, whose songs had been transferred to the bankrupt corporation under a royalty agreement, to have the copyrights reassigned
to the composers or to direct that any sale of the copyrights be subject
to the royalty agreements. In granting the motion to have the copyright
reassigned to the composers, the court observed that those who transfer
original works to a publisher in consideration for royalties "should not
be made the victims of the publisher's financial casualties."M The court
emphasized that a writer's agreement with a publisher is essentially a
personal contract in which the author relies upon the skill, judgment,
integrity, reputation, and credit of the publisher and, as such, the con55
tract is nonassignable by either party without the other's consent.
The court noted that these arrangements are essentially a transfer of
property rights in exchange for a covenant for payment of royalties to
be accounted for. Consequently, the court concluded that these arrangements sound in equity and thus involve fiduciary relationships. 56
The court also noted that authors and patentees are among the "wards
of chancery" because the value of their intangibles depends upon the
protection afforded by equity courts, and, therefore, the publisher is in
the position of a trustee.57 Consequently, the court held that such ar51. Id. at 288 (citing Oliver v. Rumford Chem. Works, 109 U.S. 76 (1883); Waterman v.

Shipman, 55 F. 982 (2d Cir. 1893)).
52. Id. at 288 (referring to the English case, Griffith v. Tower Pub. Co., 1 Ch. 21). As
to the separate objection of whether trust and confidence could be placed in a corporation
as opposed to an individual, the court found no basis for this objection, since corporate

management may generate a special confidence and may have a valuable reputation and
client base. Id.
53. 36 F.2d 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
54. Id. at 95.
55. Id. at 96.

56. Id. at 98; see also id. at 95.
57. Id. at 98.

COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. IX

rangements involve personal elements of trust and confidence and are
not assignable without the consent of the parties and that such contracts may be rescinded when the publisher does not fulfill its
58
obligations.
In re Little & Ives Co. 59 involved an agreement whereby a bankrupt
American publisher agreed with an English publisher to adapt and revise a work to make it suitable for the American market. The agreement provided that if the American publisher became insolvent or
bankrupt, the English publisher could terminate the agreement. In addition, the agreement provided that the American publisher could not
assign it without the consent of the English publisher. Once the American publisher filed for bankruptcy, its trustee sought to assign the
agreement with the English publisher.
Observing that equitable principles controlled,60 the court noted
that the termination provision protected the interest of the English
publisher by preventing its copyright and reputation from being "pirated" by others. In reaching this result, the court emphasized that the
relationship was based on "trust and confidence" and "quality performance and production. '61 The court also considered the following factors:
(1) the English publisher's trademark, (2) the provisions for protection
thereof, (3) the provisions for dismissal of personnel of the American
publisher who might sully the English publisher's reputation, (4) the
anti-assignment provisions, and (5) the termination provisions. 62 Since
equity is necessary to protect such a sensitive undertaking,63 the court
concluded that the arrangement was personal and not assignable under
traditional contract law. 64
65
The final case to be considered here is Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder.
Mills Music involved a bankrupt publisher and a bankruptcy trustee
who assigned one of the publisher's copyrights to a third party. Without
much comment, the Supreme Court stated that the third party had acquired ownership of the copyright from the bankruptcy trustee. 66
These cases illustrate the importance of analyzing the facts and circumstances peculiar to the software license at issue. In other words, the
applicability of section 365(c)(1) or 365(e)(2)(A) must be determined on
a case-by-case basis, and not as a matter of law. Nevertheless, one
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 98-99.
262 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 724.
469 U.S. 153 (1985).
Id. at 157.
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court, finding an analogy between copyright and patent law, held that
copyright licenses are not assignable as a matter of law.
In Harris v. Emus Records Corp.,67 a songwriter's wholly-owned
company licensed a record company to duplicate a musical composition.
The licensee subsequently filed a petition for bankruptcy, and the bankruptcy trustee sold parts of the debtor's assets to another person. The
lower court held that, regardless of the fact that the contract was a license, the rights granted under the license were not assignable "as a
68
matter of law" because the agreement involved personal services.
Affirming, the Ninth Circuit phrased the issue as whether copyright licenses could be transferred by a licensee, regardless of whether
the arrangement involved "personal services." Believing the issue to be
a "question of first impression" in the Ninth Circuit, the court stated
that there was authority to support the proposition that copyright
licenses are not transferable "as a matter of law."' 69 The court defended
this position by quoting Melville Nimmer's contention that under the
Copyright Act of 190970 "a licensee.. . had no right to re-sell or sublicense the rights acquired unless he [had] been expressly authorized to
do so" by the licensor.7 1 The court found further support for its position in two New York District Court cases, stating that a copyright licensee is a "bare licensee" who lacks the right to assign the privilege
72
granted in the license.
However, the court found these authorities to be merely suggestive,
not conclusive. The court went on to determine that where copyright
precedent is lacking, it is appropriate to look to patent law "because of
the historic kinship between patent law and copyright law."' 73 It then
looked to cases involving patent law, and found that patent licenses had
been characterized by the Supreme Court as naked licenses, and, as
such, were personal and not transferable. 74 In order to treat copyright
and patent analogously, as suggested by the Harriscourt, it seems that
copyright licenses must be considered nontransferable as well.
Finally, the court contended that policy considerations further support the notion that copyright licenses should not be transferable. Spe67. 734 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1984).
68. Id. at 1332.

69. Id. at 1333.
70. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1976).
71. Harris, 734 F.2d at 1333 (citing M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.01[c][4]
(1983)).
72. Id. (citing Ilyin v. Avon Publications, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Mills Music, Inc. v. Cromwell Music, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)).
73. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984)).

74. Id. (citing Hapgood v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226, 233 (1886); Unarco Indus. v. Kelley,
Co., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973)).
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cifically, the court found that Congress had carefully balanced the
needs of the copyright owners with the need to protect against monopoly, before granting to authors specific rights under the Copyright Act,
and that the balance needed to be protected. 75 The court felt that copyright owners' rights could be jeopardized if licensees were allowed to
sublicense the rights granted to them without the copyright owner's
76
consent.
The Harriscourt may or may not have reached the correct result,
but the court's view that the circumstances were irrelevant makes it difficult to analyze the court's decision. Moreover, the rationale adopted
in Harrisis troublesome for several reasons. First, the reference to patent law seems inappropriate since relevant case law, albeit outside the
Ninth Circuit, involving copyright existed at the time.77 Second, the
court implicitly opts for a federal common law rule-an approach which
is inappropriate in this context, not to mention its questionable merit in
the patent law context.78

Third, to find a copyright license excusable

from assignment as a matter of law contravenes section 365(f) of the
Bankruptcy Code: The latter section expressly permits assignment
notwithstanding a provision in "applicable law" that would prohibit the
assignment, and nothing suggests that the phrase refers only to statutory law.

79

Also, the Harris court was not
patent licenses are not assignable as
is in relative disarray on this topic.
best illustrated by starting with the

entirely correct in intimating that
a matter of law. In fact, patent law
The current state of affairs can be
exception that proves the point.

In re Alltech Plastics,8 0 is a case that involved a patent license and

bankruptcy. The case was decided subsequent to Harris,and seems to
have confronted issues most analogous to those confronted by software
developers when software users go bankrupt. In Alltech, a debtor had
been granted a license to use a patented procedure in the manufacturing of a certain product. When a third party offered to purchase the
debtor's patent license rights, the patentee-licensor objected on the
75. Id. at 1334 (citing H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909) ("The legislative history reveals an acute awareness of the needs to delicately balance competing interests. On the one hand, there is a strong reluctance to allow a monopolization of works or
compositions; at the same time, there was an awareness of the necessity of preserving the
rights of authors and composers in order to stimulate creativity.")).
76. Id.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 48-66.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 18-24. As to the federal common law approach
with respect to patent licenses, see infra text accompanying notes 80-86.
79. Permitting nonassignment on the basis of principles of "applicable law" regarding
excusability, section 365(c)(1) operates as a specific exception to the more general rule of

section 365(f).
80. 71 Bankr. 686 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1987).
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grounds that, among other things, the license was nondelegable under
applicable law. After reviewing sections 365(c) and 365(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, the court found that the right of the patent owner to license his invention, as well as the construction of the license, is a
matter of "federal common law." 8' Accordingly, the court concluded
that questions regarding assignability of patent licenses were controlled
by federal common law, and that the relevant rule was: patent licenses
are "personal and not assignable. '8 2 At no point in its analysis did the
court address the specific facts and circumstances of the patent license
83
at issue.
The conceptual flaw in Alltech and similar nonbankruptcy cases is
that they rely primarily on a principle established in nineteenth century federal cases and fail to consider the intervening decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins." Only one case has apparently seriously addressed the impact of Eie in this context. In
FarmlandIrrigation Co. v. Dopplmaier,the California Supreme Court
concluded that assignability of a patent license is a question of state law
under Erie, but that federal cases could provide a useful reference.8
The Dopplmaier court concluded that a fixed rule was unnecessary and
unwise and that each case should entail scrutiny of the "purposes and
provisions of the particular license," because nothing inherent in patent
86
licenses causes them to be so personal as to be nonassignable.
VI.

RAMIFICATIONS FOR SOFTWARE LICENSES

Given the diversity of the relationships among developer, publisher,
distributor and user (both consumer and commercial) in the software
81. Id. at 689.
82. Id.
83. The closest the court came in this regard was to reflect upon the policy underlying the rule of nonassignability of patent licenses. Alltech, 71 Bankr. at 689 ("The obvious
reason for these classifications [of patent licenses as nonassignable personal property] is to
promote the 'Progress of Science and Useful Arts' as required by the Constitution" (citing
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8)).
84. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 597 F.2d
1090, 1093-1094 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing Troy Iron & Nail v. Coming, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 193
(1852) and Annotation, Assignability of licensee's rights under patent licensing agreement, 66 A.L.R.2d 606 (1959) (which surveys mainly pre-Erie cases)), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
930 (1979); Rock-Ola Mfg. Corp. v. Filben Mfg. Co., 168 F.2d 919, 922 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 892 (1948).
Unarco Indus., Inc. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 465 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 929 (1973), was one case that did make passing reference to Erie. The court in
Unarco stated: "In post-Erie federal decisions, this rule of non-assignability has been unquestioned" (citing Rock-Ola Mg. Corp., 168 F.2d 919, which as mentioned above, made no
reference to Erie, and relied exclusively on pre-Eriecases). Id. at 1306.
85. 48 Cal.2d 208, 221, 308 P.2d 732, 739-40 (1957).
86. 48 Cal.2d at 222, 308 P.2d at 740.
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industry, and in light of the case-by-case approach that the Bankruptcy
Code requires, few generalizations can be made about the circumstances
under which software licenses will or will not be viewed as excusable
personal agreements. It seems clear that software licenses associated
with mass-marketed software programs normally will not be excusable
under section 365(c). Of course, in most instances, the software supplier
will not be concerned with whether a particular user has gone bankrupt
or is seeking to transfer the license, because the license fee typically
takes the form of a one-time, up-front payment to the software
87
supplier.
At the other extreme is the individual software author who may
have developed a program and licensed or sold it to one of the major
software development companies. If the software development company subsequently files for bankruptcy, this situation would seem to
present the classic case of a contract dependent upon the reputation,
skills and other traits of the software development company. Assuming
the agreement provides for payment of royalties to the author, the
software development company's bankruptcy trustee should not be entitled to assign the company's rights to a third party, regardless of
whether the agreement is structured as a license or in some other form.
The cases between these two extremes will present the greatest difficulty for courts. Ultimately, each case involving the excusability of a
software license from assumption or assignment, or from the invalidation of insolvency clauses, must be decided on its own merits, considering all the facts and circumstances. One special factor, somewhat
peculiar to and inherent in software licenses, will possibly affect the
analysis of excusability in this context: licenses are currently the predominant vehicle for exploiting American technological development in
software and related areas. Accordingly, bankruptcy courts need to be
especially sensitive to the policy of promoting America's technological
development when considering each particular case.
CONCLUSION
Software licenses encountered in bankruptcy proceedings arise
from a variety of circumstances and will take myriad forms. While
software licenses are often the result of a special relationship between
the parties, there are many situations in which the license is executed
without either party having any particular regard for the nature of the
relationship. In determining the excusability of a software license
87. Indeed, many mass-market program licenses contemplate that the user can, in
some manner, transfer the software license to another person, assuming the transfer is
accompanied by the original media and documentation and the transferor does not retain
a copy.
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under section 365(c)(1) or 365(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts must be sensitive to the individual nature of each case and
review each case accordingly. In this manner, the courts should not
only be able to advance the policies underlying the Bankruptcy Code,
but also assist in promoting the technological development of the
United States.

